A n important characteristic of any offer is the deadline at which it expires. We consider an ultimatum deadline game in which the proposer's decision variable is the offer deadline, while the responder faces a standard finite-horizon search problem. We show that the responder's strategy is characterized by a shortest acceptable deadline: at the time of deadline, he accepts an offer if the deadline is longer than his shortest acceptable deadline, and rejects it otherwise. If the proposer has all information available to the responder, the optimal deadline is the responder's shortest acceptable deadline. If the proposer is uncertain about the responder's situation, the optimal deadline gets longer, unless this uncertainty is very large. After normative analysis of the deadline setting problem, we present results from a behavioral study of the game. The average shortest acceptable deadline set by the responders equals the one that would maximize the expected value, whereas the proposers tend to set deadlines that are too short. The prescriptive conclusion for a proposer, emerging from the model and the experiment, is that in case of uncertainty it is better to set a deadline longer than what would be optimal if uncertainty were ignored.
Introduction
Microsoft made an unsolicited bid for Yahoo! in early 2008. According to media reports, Steve Ballmer, the CEO of Microsoft, issued an ultimatum that gave Yahoo! three weeks to meet at the negotiation table. During the same period, reports showed that Yahoo! was discussing a limited ad-sharing partnership with Google, its (and Microsoft's) big rival, and also discussing deals with Time Warner's AOL. Perhaps Yahoo! could find an offer better than Microsoft's, if it held out. But perhaps not. Supposing one wanted to issue an ultimatum deadline such as Ballmer's, how long should it be? What trade-offs must be considered? This paper addresses these issues.
Deadlines appear nearly everywhere in business and in life. Freshly minted Masters of Business Administration (MBAs) receive offers from investment banks and consulting firms that "explode" on a particular date. Airlines offer limited time deals such as reduced fares (or sales) for particular dates between two locations. We refer to such exploding offer scenarios as ultimatum deadline games. In these games there are decisions that must be made on both sides of the transaction. The proposer (the investment bank, the airline) must decide on a deadline to give, and the responder (the candidate, the consumer) must decide whether to accept or reject the offer at the time of the deadline. In some settings, both the proposer and the responder would choose from a number of prospects. Here, we study the case in which the proposer has already settled on a particular responder.
In the ultimatum deadline game, the proposer acts as a Stackelberg leader, setting an ultimatum deadline for her offer. The responder, who may yet receive other offers (according to a stochastic arrival process), must then accept or reject the proposer's offer at the time of the deadline if he has not already accepted another one. The responder must balance the risk (or opportunity costs) of accepting a sure-thing (bird-inthe-hand) offer too soon and missing out on better alternatives that might arise in the future, and the risk of passing up a sure thing and not finding anything better. We show that the responder's optimal strategy involves a shortest acceptable deadline (SAD): if no better (preferred) offer is received prior to the proposer's deadline, the responder should accept any offer with a deadline longer than his SAD and reject any offer with a shorter deadline.
The proposer's optimal deadline maximizes the probability that the responder accepts her offer. When the responder's SAD is known to the proposer, the optimal ultimatum deadline is equal to the responder's SAD. When the proposer is unsure about the responder's situation, she is better off setting longer deadlines (relative to the case where the SAD is known) when her uncertainty is relatively small, and setting shorter deadlines when her uncertainty is substantial. (Loosely speaking, if the proposer believes that the SAD is 6 or 8 days, the optimal deadline is 8 days, whereas if she believes it is 2 or 12 days, the optimal deadline is 2 days.) Theoretical analysis is in §3, and §4 presents an experiment in which we examine the behavior of flesh-and-blood players (MBA participants) in an ultimatum deadline game.
Setup and Background
For focus-to anchor and aid the narrative-in most of what follows, we will frame the ultimatum deadline game as a hiring problem. Imagine the proposer as a firm making a job offer, and the responder as a job applicant receiving the offer. We suppose that the firm would like to maximize its probability of successfully hiring the applicant, and that the applicant wishes to maximize his expected utility. He is engaged in a job search process that can be represented by a generic sequential search (or optimal stopping) problem. In this section, we review the literature that provides the most important foundation for our work.
Related Theoretical Work
There is now a sizable literature on the economics of job search. The foundational work of Stigler (1961 Stigler ( , 1962 has been extended in a number of ways, and includes both theoretical models and empirical tests of those models using data from actual labor markets (more recent developments are reviewed in Mortensen 1987) . Typically, job search models are formulated as dynamic models of optimal search in the face of uncertainty, i.e., as optimal stopping problems. A basic assumption underlying these models is that the job seeker wishes to maximize some function of future income stream. Under standard models (e.g., Gilbert and Mosteller 1966 , Freeman 1983 , Gronau 1971 , Lippman and McCall 1976 , Mortensen 1970 , Presman and Sonin 1972 , in each period of the search process the job seeker receives an offer from a single firm with some specified probability (most often with probability one). When an offer is received, it must be accepted or rejected on the spot. Most commonly, the offers are treated as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from a known wage distribution. Under many formulations of these search problems, the optimal policy for the searcher is represented by a set of decreasing reservation values (Van Den Berg 1990) . In other words, as the search process moves closer to the end of the horizon, the searcher becomes willing to accept progressively poorer alternatives, because the option value of continued search is progressively decreasing. This type of decreasing option value (through time) will play an important role in our model. Implicit in most job search models formulated as optimal stopping problems is that the firms give the searcher exploding offers that must be accepted or rejected on the spot. There are other formulations in which the searcher can recall previously rejected offers (e.g., Karni and Schwartz 1977) . However, the length of the window given to the searcher is exogenous and not treated as a decision variable for the offering firm. In reality, in some markets (e.g., for newly minted MBAs entering consulting), firms often do give job applicants offers with deadlines, but generally the offers do not explode on the spot. Instead, an applicant is given, say, two weeks to make a decision. On the date of the deadline, the applicant, if he has not accepted another position already, can accept the offer, or reject it and wait for a better one, which may or may not come. In some cases, there is room for negotiation, and the applicant may be able to get additional time to make a decision. Here, however, we will focus only on cases in which the deadline is issued as an ultimatum-where the decision date is nonnegotiable.
1 Two-sided matching markets bear some similarity to the problem we consider here (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) . In these markets, the sets of firms (proposers) and applicants (responders) are fixed a priori. A major objective of this line of work has been to find methods for creating stable matchings (as conceived by Gale and Shapley 1962) . Some actual markets (e.g., the National Resident Matching Program, for new physicians) employ a centralized clearinghouse where firms and applicants are matched simultaneously by a central authority. There are also decentralized markets in which they are matched sequentially.
Markets for clerks for federal appellate judges, for example, employ such a decentralized matching system. Law school students apply for clerkship positions, and then they can receive offers from the judges themselves. Exploding offers are the norm in these markets, and offers, once made, are generally not rejected (Niederle and Roth 2007) . Importantly, quite often the offers explode on the spot (Avery et al. 2007 ). The applicants are not given the opportunity to see what other offers might present themselves in the future.
2 One unfortunate consequence of this market design is that it leads to significant unravelling. The market encourages judges to make offers progressively earlier to get the best applicants. In some cases the markets start to clear in the Fall after the first year of law school. The result is that judges hire students on the basis of very noisy signals, because they have 1 Baucells and Lippman (2004) examined a somewhat related problem in which a buyer and a seller must negotiate a price, and the seller has the outside option of sequentially searching for a buyer with a higher willingness to pay. One extension of our research is a setting in which the searcher and the firm can bargain over the length of the deadline. 2 One respondent in a survey of applicants for judicial clerkships reported (Avery et al. 2007 , p. 447): "I had ten minutes to accept." very little information about their law acumen. (Roth and Xing 1994 , Suen 2000 , Li and Rosen 1998 , and Li and Suen 2004 provide richer descriptions of unravelling in matching markets.)
Our work is distinguished from the work on twosided matching markets in at least two important ways. First, the matching market literature has focused on settings in which the applicants and the set of open positions become available at the same time (simultaneously). This holds in a number of entrylevel labor markets such as those for new physicians, new junior professors, and appellate law clerks. But in many, if not most, markets applicants and positions become available sequentially. For example, the set of administrative assistants looking for employment in Singapore, as well as the set of open positions for them, changes daily. In such markets it is not possible to employ a centralized matching mechanism. Nor can methods based on matching firms and applicants according to their rank-ordered preferences for one another (the most common mechanism employed by two-sided matching algorithms) be used-whether it be done simultaneously or sequentially (e.g., the decentralized procedures used for matching clinical psychologists and positions, Roth and Xing 1997) . This is because the rank orderings are dynamic: they depend on what applicants and positions are present in the market at any one time, as well as on the participants' expectations about what new alternatives might arise in the future. To capture this dynamic feature we suppose that the alternatives (the positions) available to an applicant arrive according to a generic stochastic process akin to those one finds in standard job search problems, discussed above.
Second, and most importantly, the work on twosided matching has not treated the length of the deadline given to applicants as a decision variablethe nature of the deadline has been imposed exogenously. Many markets have their own "culture" that dictates whether exploding offers are permissible or whether offers are open-ended, meaning they do not expire prior to the close of the market, which is at some future date (e.g., April 15 for graduate school admissions). There has been some work comparing the outcomes of markets with exploding offers to those with open-ended offers (e.g., Niederle and Roth 2007) . But there are many deadline possibilities that lie between on-the-spot exploding offers and those that are open-ended.
Before setting a deadline at which the offer explodes, firms must decide to whom to make an offer and the value of the offer. The problem of selecting a candidate from an available set has been approached in a number of ways (e.g., Chun 1999 , Chun et al. 1994 ). Likewise, it is possible to model the decision regarding the value of the offer in several ways. For instance, one could model it as bargaining or auctioning problems such as those described in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) , Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) , and Seale et al. (2001) . Here, we suppose that the proposer has already identified the candidate and established the value of the offer, and we focus on setting the deadline that maximizes the probability that the offer is accepted.
Related Behavioral Work
From a prescriptive point of view, both the normative and the descriptive aspects of decision making are important. Normative models deepen our understanding of how features of the decision problem should influence decision behavior, and they also provide a basis for evaluating behavior, serving as standards of the quality of decision making. Now, we briefly review some relevant behavioral literature, and show that there is good reason to anticipate that normative models might not perfectly predict behavior in ultimatum deadline games.
In addition to the substantial body of theoretical work, there have been a number of studies of the behavior of human decision makers in sequential search problems (e.g., Bearden et al. 2005 Bearden et al. , 2006 Cox and Oaxaca 1989; Rapoport 1997, 2000) . This research demonstrates that the optimal models often fail to predict the behavior of actual flesh-andblood decision makers. For instance, human subjects tend to stop searching sooner than is optimal. Importantly, though, in these problems, the subjects faced games against nature. They were not playing against people. Other research has shown that whether one plays games against nature or against flesh-and-blood opponents can influence behavior significantly (e.g., Sanfey et al. 2003) . The bias to accept early offers might not necessarily occur if the offers are generated by people rather than by chance.
There is good reason to expect that psychologicaland not just purely "rational"-considerations come into play in the context of offers with ultimatum deadlines. From the enormous body of literature on the ultimatum game, we know that the standard normative assumptions underlying the game-theoretic predictions do not hold (Bearden 2001 , Roth 1995 . In the standard ultimatum game, the proposer offers the responder some fraction of a fixed pie. If the responder accepts the offer, the pie is split accordingly; if the responder rejects the offer, then neither player earns anything. The subgame perfect equilibrium is that the proposer offers the smallest possible slice of the pie and the responder accepts it. This is because the responder is strictly better off with something rather than nothing, which is what he gets if he rejects the offer. The proposer maximizes her own payoff by offering the smallest slice that the responder will accept-the responder's minimal acceptable offer. In contrast to the game-theoretic prediction, typically one finds that small offers (say $1 from a $10 pie) are rejected, and that most proposers offer more than the smallest possible slice. One explanation for this is that the human players have fairness concerns that trump pure pecuniary payoffs: small offers are perceived as unfair and are therefore rejected. The proposers seem to anticipate that.
Bargaining and negotiation outcomes can be strongly impacted by the amount of time parties have to make their decisions (see, e.g., Champagne 2000, Stuhlmacher et al. 1998) . Often, the impact of time pressure on outcomes is negative, resulting in greater nonagreements and generally poorer outcomes (e.g., Carnevale and Lawler 1986) . Sutter et al. (2003) , for example, showed that rejection rates in ultimatum games tend to be even greater when the respondent must make his decision under time pressure.
It is not hard to imagine that offers with very short deadlines might be perceived as unfair, or as bullying. Thus, purely normative considerations that only take into account material payoffs might not provide the best prescriptive basis. One can imagine that a model might dictate a firm giving a very short deadline, and yet find that the offer is rejected because the deadline is seen as unfair by an applicant. Of course, there are any number of psychological reasons why model predictions based on standard assumptions of rationality might fail to provide good predictions of actual behavior. Notions such as the anticipated regret of rejecting an offer and not finding a better one, or pure optimism that "something better will come along" could also play a role in the ultimatum deadline game and the settings it is intended to model. The psychology involved in these settings is undoubtedly rich. The results from our behavioral study, reported in §4, provide a straightforward test of the normative (model) predictions. Now, we describe the game and its solution formally.
Ultimatum Deadline Game and Its Solution
We consider a situation where, at time zero, the proposer makes an offer that expires at deadline t D . The deadline is the time at which the offer explodes, and it is issued as an ultimatum (i.e., nonnegotiable). The responder follows a standard finite-horizon search model, looking for other alternatives. If the responder accepts the proposer's offer, the proposer gets payoff one, and if the responder rejects the offer, the proposer gets zero. If the responder accepts the proposer's offer, he gets utility u O , and if he rejects the proposer's offer, he gets the utility resulting from continuation of the search.
The proposer moves first, by setting deadline t D , t D ≥ 0. If the responder accepts the proposer's offer, he cannot accept any other alternative. Therefore, the responder will hold the proposer's offer until the deadline, and decide whether to accept the proposer's offer at time t D . At that point, the responder is facing a choice between accepting the proposer's offer and thus receiving u O or rejecting the proposer's offer and thus receiving the expected utility of continued search.
To summarize the game, the responder must decide whether to accept or reject the proposer's offer at time t D to maximize his expected utility. The proposer must decide which deadline t D to set to maximize the probability that the responder accepts her offer. Our base model of the responder's search process is specified in Assumption 1. (ii) If the responder ends up with no offer (i.e., the responder rejects the proposer's offer and no alternative from the search comes), the responder's utility is u L , u L < u O .
(iii) The alternatives with utility u H arrive stochastically from time zero until time T . This stochastic process is specified by G t , the probability that at least one alternative arrives during the time window from zero to t, with G 0 = 0.
For example, if alternatives arrive according to a Poisson process with rate , the probability of at least one arriving before time t is G t = 1 − e − t . Another interpretation of Assumption 1 is that there is only one party that can issue an alternative with utility u H to the responder. The probability that this will occur is p = G T , and the moment at which the alternative will arrive is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F t = G t /p with support 0 T . This setting is quite general, as it allows for any pattern of the alternative arrival rate. It is more restrictive than the standard search setting because we assume that all alternatives have exactly the same utility for the responder, u H . That would make the standard search problem uninteresting, because the searcher's strategy would be simply to accept the first alternative that comes along. However, our focus is on the proposer's strategy. Therefore, the assumption that all alternatives have the same utility seems appropriate, because it allows us to solve the problem analytically while maintaining the main property of the search process, namely the decreasing (option) value of continuing the search.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 consider the responder's and the proposer's strategies under Assumption 1. Section 3.3 presents generalizations to more standard search processes where the alternatives do not necessarily have the same utility u H but are drawn from a known distribution.
Responder's Strategy
The standard finite-horizon search model is characterized by a reservation value (expected value of continuing search) that is decreasing in time, so that the responder accepts any offer above the reservation value and rejects any offer below it. When facing the proposer's offer with deadline t D , the responder should reject it if the offer is below the reservation value (at time t D ), and accept it otherwise. Proposition 1 gives an analytical solution for the responder's shortest acceptable deadline when Assumption 1 holds.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Define
Then the responder should accept the proposer's offer with deadline t D if and only if
Proof. Suppose the proposer makes an offer with deadline t D . To compute the expected utility of continuing the search, we need to find the probability that a better alternative will arrive after t D , given that one has not arrived before. By Bayes' theorem, this probability equals G T − G t D / 1 − G t D , because G T − G t D is the probability of at least one alternative arriving after t D and no alternative arriving before t D , and 1 − G t D is the probability of no alternative arriving before t D . Then the expected utility of continuing the search at time
The proposer's offer will be accepted if and only if
The minimal value of t D that satisfies this inequality is t * D , given by (2). The critical deadline t * D , defined in Proposition 1, is the SAD, in the sense that an offer with deadline shorter than the SAD will be rejected by the responder. The value u, defined in (1), can be interpreted as the relative utility of the proposer's offer, with respect to u L and u H . In particular, for u L = 0 and u H =1, u = u O . The SAD decreases with u, which in turn implies that it decreases with u O , and it increases with u H and u L . This agrees with intuition: The SAD is shorter when the proposer's offer is more attractive, compared to the prospect of continuing to search. In particular, for u ≥ G T , the SAD is zero. In addition, the SAD is shorter (longer) for more risk averse (risk seeking) responder, as stated by Corollary 1. This parallels Chatterjee and Samuelson's (1983) result that, in a bargaining setting, a risk averse seller becomes less demanding about the price. In our case, a risk averse responder becomes less demanding about the deadline. Corollary 1. Consider responder 1 with utility function for wealth v 1 w and responder 2 with utility function v 2 w . If responder 2 is more risk averse than responder 1 (i.e., v 2 w = v 1 w , where · is increasing and concave), then the SAD for responder 2 is shorter.
Proof. Let w L , w H , and w O be both responders' wealth levels corresponding to ending up with no offer, accepting an alternative, and accepting proposer's offer. Then u i L = v i w L , u i H = v i w H , and u i O = v i w O for i = 1 2. Without loss of generality, assume that v 1 · and v 2 · are such that u i L = 0 and u i H = 1, and therefore 0 = 0 and 1 = 1. By (1), for responder 2, u 2 = u 2 O = u 1 O , and we need to show that it is greater than u 1 = u 1 O . This follows from concavity of
To summarize, the responder's strategy is to accept the proposer's offer at the time of the deadline if the offer value is higher than his expected utility (reservation value) of continuing the search at that time. Because this reservation value is decreasing in time, we can define the SAD as the minimal time at which the reservation value is lower than the utility of the proposer's offer. The responder's strategy is to accept (reject) an offer with deadline longer (shorter) than SAD. To finalize the analysis of the game, we now turn to the proposer's strategy.
Proposer's Strategy
First, we consider a situation where the proposer knows the responder's SAD. Then, in §3.2.1, we consider the case where the responder can be of one of two types, i.e., where the responder's SAD has two possible values. Section 3.2.2 deals with a more general case of a continuous distribution over the responder's SAD.
If the proposer has all information that is available to the responder (i.e., u O and the parameters of the search process specified in Assumption 1), then the proposer can rationally derive the responder's SAD. In that case the optimal strategy for the proposer is to set the deadline equal to the responder's SAD (i.e., t * D given by (2)). This result is intuitive: if the deadline is shorter than the SAD, the proposer's offer will be rejected. If the deadline t D is longer than t * D , there is a chance that a better alternative will arrive between t * D and t D , and thus the probability that the responder will accept the proposer's offer is lower than if the deadline is set at t * D . Observe that by setting the deadline at t D ≥ t * D , the proposer's offer will be accepted with probability 1 − G t D , i.e., the probability that a better alternative does not arrive before time t D . When t D = t * D , given by (2), this probability equals min 1 1 − G T / 1 − u , which is greater than 1 − G T , probability that an alternative with utility u H does not come at all. This illustrates that the proposer benefits by imposing a deadline, rather than passively waiting. Also, if G T ≤ u, where u is defined by (1), the optimal deadline is zero (i.e., on the spot) and thus the proposer's offer is accepted with probability one. This result is also intuitive: if
, the responder prefers getting u O (i.e., accepting the proposer's offer) to the lottery of receiving u H with probability G T and u L otherwise, and therefore setting the deadline at zero (i.e., giving take-it-or-leave-it offer) is optimal for the proposer.
3.2.1. Responder Is of One of Two Types. We now consider a situation in which the responder is of one of two types, i.e., the responder's SAD is either t 1 or t 2 , 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 ≤ T , with probabilities 1 and 2 = 1 − 1 , correspondingly. For instance, this would be the case if the proposer is uncertain about at least one of the responder's utilities u L , u O , u H , and believes that with probability 1 these utilities are such that t * D , given by (2), equals t 1 , and with probability 2 it equals t 2 . We assume that the alternatives arrive at the same rate, i.e., G t is the same for both types. Which deadline should the proposer set in this case? Proposition 2 provides conditions for the shorter or longer deadline to be optimal.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the responder's SAD is either t 1 or t 2 , 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 ≤ T , with probabilities 1 and 2 = 1 − 1 , and G t is the same for both types. Then the following applies:
(i) If the two possible SADs are close enough, the proposer should set the longer deadline. Formally, if G t 2 − G t 1 < 2 / 1 1 − G T , then the proposer should set the deadline to t 2 .
(ii) If G t 2 < 2 (in particular, if G T < 2 ), the proposer should set the longer deadline ( for any t 1 ).
(iii) If G t 2 > 2 and the deadline t 1 is close enough to zero, the proposer should set the shorter deadline.
Proof. Denote by Pr t D the probability that the responder accepts the offer with deadline t D . If t D < t 1 < t 2 , then Pr t D = 0, because the deadline is shorter than any of the SADs. If t 1 ≤ t D < t 2 , then Pr t D = before t D . If t D ≥ t 2 , then Pr t D = 1 − G t D , i.e., the probability that a better alternative does not arrive before t D . To summarize,
First observe that the optimal deadline t D should equal either t 1 or t 2 : If t D < t 1 < t 2 , the proposer's offer will be rejected for sure, so the proposer would do at least as well by changing deadline from t D to t 1 . If t 1 < t D < t 2 , the proposer again would do better by setting deadline t 1 , because the responder with deadline t 1 will accept it anyway, and the responder with deadline t 2 will still reject it. Finally, if t D > t 2 > t 1 , the proposer is better off by changing deadline t D to t 2 . Therefore, the proposer's choice is between setting deadline at t 1 or t 2 .
Setting the longer deadline is optimal if and only if Pr t 1 < Pr t 2 , or
The first statement follows from (3) and G t 2 ≤ G T . The second statement follows from (3) and noticing that G t 2 − G t 1 ≤ G t 2 , because G t 1 ≥ 0. Then G t 2 < 2 / 1 1 − G t 2 is equivalent to G t 2 < 2 . The proof of the third statement is similar: If G t 2 > 2 , then Pr t 1 > Pr t 2 when G t 1 is close enough to zero.
For given probabilities of responder's types, 1 and 2 , the difference between t 2 and t 1 can be interpreted as a measure of the proposer's uncertainty about the responder's SAD. The first claim of Proposition 2 states that if the uncertainty about the responder's SAD is small (in the sense that t 1 and t 2 are close to each other), then the proposer should set the longer deadline. The second is that if the probability of the longer SAD ( 2 ) is greater than the probability of losing the responder by the time of the longer SAD (G t 2 ), then setting the longer deadline is optimal. The third states that if the shorter SAD is close enough to zero, then setting the shorter deadline is optimal unless chances that the responder's SAD is the longer one are very high.
Setting the longer deadline implies that the proposer makes her offer acceptable to both types. Proposition 2 shows that doing so is optimal if (a) the two types are not very far from each other or (b) the probability of a better alternative coming is lower than the probability that the responder's SAD is the longer one. Focusing on the type with the shorter deadline is optimal only if the probability that the responder's SAD is the longer one is not very high, and the two responder's types are far enough from each other.
To conclude, if the two possible responder's SADs are close enough to one another, the proposer should set the longer deadline to make her offer acceptable to either type. If the possible SADs are far enough from each other, the proposer should set the shorter deadline if the probability of the responder having the shorter SAD is not very small. The next section reveals that this intuition extends to a more general case in which the distribution of the responder's SAD is continuous.
3.2.2. Responder's Type Is Continuously Distributed. This section considers a situation where the distribution of the responder's SAD is continuous. To simplify the solution, it is convenient to parameterize uncertainty about the responder's SAD via a distribution over a dummy variable z, which can be interpreted as the responder's type. The distribution of the responder's SAD will be specified by mapping from z to SAD. Define z = u H − u L / u H − u O . Observe that z > 1, because u L < u O < u H . By (1), z = 1/ 1 − u , and from (2) the responder's SAD is
Let H z and h z be the cdf and the probability density function (pdf) for z. We assume that the distribution of z has an increasing generalized failure rate, i.e., the ratio zh z / 1 − H z is increasing. 4 First, we establish the optimal deadline to be set by the proposer.
Proposition 3. Suppose the responder's type z, z > 1, has distribution with pdf h z , cdf H z , and that it has an increasing generalized failure rate. Given a realization of z, the responder's SAD is given by (4). Define z * as
Then the optimal deadline to be set by the proposer is t * D z * , given by (4).
Proof. The probability that the responder will accept the offer with deadline t D is
Lariviere (2006) If the responder's type z is known to the proposer, a higher value of z implies a shorter SAD (as follows from (4)), and thus the proposer sets a shorter optimal deadline. The same result holds in the case of uncertainty, if we compare two distributions of z where one dominates the other in terms of the failure rate.
Proposition 4. Suppose that h 1 z / 1 − H 1 z ≤ h 2 z / 1 − H 2 z for all z, and both zh 1 z / 1 − H 1 z and zh 2 z / 1 − H 2 z are increasing. The optimal deadline set by the proposer when the responder's type is drawn from the distribution with pdf h 1 z is less than or equal to the optimal deadline when the responder's type is drawn from the distribution with pdf h 2 z .
Proof. Denote by z * i , i = 1 2, the solution of (5) for the distribution with pdf h i z . From h 1 z / 1 − H 1 z ≤ h 2 z / 1 − H 2 z , increasing generalized failure rates for h 1 z and h 2 z , and (5), it follows that z * 1 ≥ z * 2 , and therefore t * D z * 1 ≤ t * D z * 2 . Remark 1. Dominance in terms of the failure rate implies first-order stochastic dominance (Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994) . First-order stochastic dominance would not be sufficient for Proposition 4 to hold. Consider the following example, based on Proposition 2. Set G t = 2 3 t/T , with T = 10. Let h 1 z be the probability mass function (pmf) such that z is either 2 6 or 2 8 with equal probabilities, and let pmf h 2 z be such that z is either 1 2 or 2 8 with equal probabilities. By (4), when the responder's type is drawn from the distribution with pmf h 1 , the SAD is either 1 or 2 with equal probabilities; when the responder's type is drawn from the distribution with pmf h 2 , the SAD is either 1 or 9 with equal probabilities. By Proposition 2 (Equation (3)), the optimal deadline is two for the first distribution and one for the second. Thus, even though h 1 dominates h 2 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, the optimal deadline under the distribution with pmf h 1 is longer.
Proposition 4 shows that as the offer gets more attractive to the responder (as higher values of z imply that the responder values the proposer's offer more, and distribution of z improves in the sense of failure rate), the optimal deadline gets shorter. Next we consider the impact of uncertainty about the responder's type on the optimal deadline set by the proposer.
Let be a random variable with increasing failure rate, standard deviation one, and cdf H 0 , H 0 − = 0, > 0. The responder's type is z = + , where > 1+ . Then z > 1, and the distribution of z has cdf H z = H 0 z − / and an increasing generalized failure rate. The standard deviation of distribution H z equals , and increasing (decreasing) corresponds to stretching (contracting) around . In that sense serves as a measure of uncertainty about z. We now consider how the optimal deadline changes with .
Observe that when = 0, the distribution of z is degenerate with the mass point at , and then the optimal deadline equals t * D
. The next proposition shows that if
is not large, the optimal deadline is no shorter than t * D , and if is large enough, the optimal deadline is no longer than t * D . 
Proof.
Observe that h z = 1/ h 0 z − / . By (5),
First, we show that if < h 0 0 / 1 − H 0 0 , then z * < , and therefore t * Small uncertainty (i.e., small ) in the setting with continuous types corresponds to a small difference between two types. In that case, the optimal deadline is longer compared to the case of no uncertainty. Similarly, large uncertainty (i.e., large ) in the setting with continuous types corresponds to a large difference between two types. Then the optimal deadline is shorter, compared to the case of no uncertainty, provided that G T , the probability of a better alternative to come, is sufficiently large. 6 Example 1. To illustrate our results from this section and from Proposition 5 in particular, let H z be uniform on − √ 3 + √ 3 , so that and are the mean and standard deviation of z. To ensure z > 1 we assume
By Proposition 3, the optimal deadline to be set by the proposer is
Consistent with Proposition 5, the optimal deadline is increasing in until reaches / 3 √ 3 , and then it decreases with . For > < / √ 3 the optimal deadline is shorter (longer) than the one with no uncertainty, i.e., than t * D
. 6 In the case of two types, the necessary condition for the shorter deadline to be optimal is G T > 2 . For continuous types, the range of and is such that − > 1. For the optimal deadline to be shorter, should be large enough so that − > 1 for > h 0 0 / 1 − H 0 0 , and G T should be large enough so that < 1/ 1 − G T .
Generalizations
The main limitation of our model of the responder's search process, specified by Assumption 1, is that we assume that all alternatives from search have the same utility u H . A more standard approach is to assume that any alternative that comes is drawn from some distribution. In this section we discuss how our results would generalize or change when we take that into account. In a wide class of search models, including a standard finite-horizon search, the reservation value of search is decreasing over time (Van Den Berg 1990, Theorem 2) . If this is the case, the responder's reaction to the proposer's offer is characterized by a shortest acceptable deadline, defined as the minimal time at which the reservation value is less than the value of the offer. Proposition 1 extends to this setting, though the expression for the SAD would be more complicated and depend on the specifics of the search process.
We now turn to the analysis of the proposer's strategy. If the responder's SAD is known, is it the optimal deadline for the proposer to set? Setting a deadline shorter than the responder's SAD is not optimal, because in this case, the offer will be rejected for sure. Setting a deadline t longer than the responder's SAD is not optimal if the probability that the responder will accept the proposer's offer is decreasing in t, for t greater than the SAD. That seems intuitive, because increasing the deadline from t 1 to t 2 gives the responder a chance to accept an alternative resulting from his search process between t 1 and t 2 . For the standard search process with i.i.d. draws this intuition is correct, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 6. Suppose the responder follows the standard search process (e.g., Lippman and McCall 1976) with T sequential i.i.d. draws, and has an offer from the proposer that expires at time t, t ≥ SAD. Then the probability that the responder will accept the proposer's offer is decreasing in t.
Proof. Consider two deadlines, t 1 and t 2 , with SAD ≤ t 1 < t 2 . When the deadline equals t 1 , the responder faces the standard search problem with t 1 draws (because he will stop searching at t 1 and accept the proposer's offer). When the deadline is t 2 , the responder faces the standard search problem with t 2 draws. If we assume that, when the deadline is t 2 , he just ignores the first t 2 − t 1 draws, the situation is identical to the one with deadline t 1 . Because there is positive probability that the responder will get an alternative above the reservation value in the first t 2 − t 1 draws, the probability that the responder will accept the proposer's offer with deadline t 2 is lower, compared to the case where the deadline is t 1 . (On a side, when the deadline is t 2 , the reservation value at time t is the same as the reservation value at time t − t 2 + t 1 in the game with deadline t 1 .) Proposition 6 is formulated for the search process with finite number of i.i.d. draws. The proof is similar for the case where the search process is formulated in continuous time, with alternatives arriving sequentially according to a Poisson process (Cowan and Zabczyk 1978) . However, the assumption of i.i.d. draws is crucial here. As Example 2 illustrates, when the search process involves non-i.i.d. draws, it might be the case that the proposer would prefer to set the deadline longer than the responder's SAD.
Example 2. Suppose the (risk neutral) responder's search model is the following: He expects to see alternatives in both periods 1 and 2. The alternative in period 1 will pay $2 with probability 0.9 and $0 with probability 0.1. The alternative in period 2 will pay $10 with probability 0.1 and $0 with probability 0.9. The value of the proposer's offer is $1.5. The SAD in this situation is 1: At the end of period 1, the responder will accept the proposer's offer, because the expected value of continuing search (i.e., the reservation value) is $10 × 0 1 < $1 5. Should the proposer set the deadline to 1 or 2? If deadline t D = 1, the proposer's offer will be accepted with probability 0.1-probability that the responder did not receive an alternative of $2 in the first period. If deadline t D = 2, the proposer's offer will be accepted with probability 0.9-the probability that the responder did not receive an alternative of $10 in the second period. This is because the responder will reject the first-period alternative, since the reservation value in the first period becomes $10 × 0 1 + $1 5 × 0 9 = $2 35, which is greater than $2, the highest possible value of the alternative in the first period.
The intuition behind this example is the following: By increasing the deadline, there are two counteracting effects. One is that it gives the responder more time to see the alternatives coming from the search process, which is bad for the proposer. The second is that it increases the responder's reservation value before the deadline is reached, which is good for the proposer. As Proposition 6 shows, the first effect dominates in the case of i.i.d. draws. In Example 2, the second effect dominates.
To conclude, our result that if the responder's SAD is known, the proposer should set a deadline equal to the SAD generalizes to a standard search process with i.i.d. draws of alternatives. However, if the alternatives do not have the same distribution (as in Example 2), this dictate might not hold.
We now consider a situation in which the responder is of one of two types i, i = 1 2, appearing with probabilities 1 and 2 = 1 − 1 , respectively. For type i, let t i denote its shortest acceptable deadline, t 2 > t 1 , and let Pr i t , t ≥ t i , denote the probability that the responder will accept the proposer's offer with deadline t. We assume that Pr i t is decreasing. (By Proposition 6, this is the case for a standard search process.) As Proposition 7 below shows, Proposition 2 essentially extends.
Proposition 7. (i) If the SADs t 1 and t 2 are close enough, the proposer should set the longer deadline. More specifically, if Pr 1 t 1 − Pr 1 t 2 < 2 Pr 2 t 2 / 1 , then the optimal deadline is t 2 .
(ii) If 2 Pr 2 t 2 / 1 > 1, the proposer should set the longer deadline.
(iii) If the SADs t 1 and t 2 are far enough apart, so that Pr 1 t 1 − Pr 1 t 2 > 2 Pr 2 t 2 / 1 , the proposer should set the shorter deadline.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the proposer's choice is between t D = t 1 and t D = t 2 . When t D = t 1 , the probability that the responder accepts the offer equals 1 Pr 1 t 1 , i.e., the probability that the responder is of type 1 times the probability that the responder will still be available at time t 1 . When t D = t 2 , the probability that the responder accepts the offer equals 1 Pr 1 t 2 + 2 Pr 2 t 2 . Then setting the deadline to t 2 is better than setting the deadline to t 1 if and only if 1 Pr 1 t 1 < 1 Pr 1 t 2 + 2 Pr 2 t 2
The first claim of Proposition 7 states that if the uncertainty surrounding the responder's SAD is small (in the sense that t 1 and t 2 are close to each other), then the proposer should set the longer deadline. The second states the condition under which setting the longer deadline is always optimal. The third is inverse to the first claim, and states when setting the shorter deadline is optimal. These statements agree with Proposition 2.
To summarize, the theoretical analysis suggests that the responder's strategy is to accept the proposer's offer if the deadline is longer than the responder's SAD and to reject the offer if the deadline is shorter than the SAD. If the responder's SAD is known to the proposer, the SAD itself is the optimal deadline for the proposer to set. If the proposer is uncertain about the responder's SAD, she should set a longer deadline unless the degree of uncertainty is very large (Propositions 2 and 5). These conclusions also hold in more general search settings (Propositions 6 and 7). We now turn to the experimental (descriptive) analysis of this game.
Behavioral Experiment

Overview and Method
We examined decision behavior of both responders and proposers in the ultimatum deadline game.
In total, 142 subjects participated in the study: 69 were assigned randomly to the role of responder and 73 to the role of proposer. They were paid based on their performance. In addition to a fixed S$5 showup fee, subjects in the responder role earned an average of S$21 for the 15 minute experiment, whereas those in the proposer role earned an average of S$8.
The subjects were recruited through an MBA core course at INSEAD. The students were quite diverse, representing a range of nationalities, ages, and backgrounds. In class, they were presented with a brief description of the ultimatum deadline game and the protocols for taking part in the online experiment. Then, each of them received a personalized email invitation to participate in the study. The email contained a link to the online software for playing the game, a notification of whether the student would play the role of proposer or responder, and a personalized password to access the experimental software.
Once logged into the experimental site, each subject was provided with extensive written instructions describing the task and the way payoffs would be determined. Subjects were told that proposers and responders would be matched randomly at the conclusion of the experiment, and then paid according to the rules of the game once everyone had participated, which was expected to be-and was-about one week later. To aid intuition, the problem was described as a job search problem.
Subjects in both roles were provided with the payoff contingencies. Specifically, they were told that the responder could earn S$40 if he received and accepted a better alternative (u H = S$40), S$10 if he accepted the proposer's offer (u O = S$10), and that he would earn nothing otherwise (u L = S$0). The proposer would earn S$40 if the responder accepted her offer.
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The experimental "season" lasted for a period of 10 days (T = 10). Subjects in both roles were told that there is a 50% chance that a better alternative will arrive, and if it arrives, that will occur on any of the 10 days with equal probability. Subjects were also provided with a table showing the probabilities of the responder receiving a better alternative on or before each day t, and another one showing the probabilities of receiving a better one after each day t given that he has not received one sooner. These probabilities are displayed together in Table 1 , and correspond to G t = 0 5t/T . As an example, the probability that a responder will receive a better alternative on or before day 7 is 0.35, and the probability that he will receive 7 Pragmatic considerations drove the selection of these payoff parameters. We wished to avoid instances of the game with trivial solutions (e.g., with SADs of 1 or 10), and also ones in which our inferences from the response might be confounded for uninteresting reasons (e.g., if the optimal SAD were 5, and subjects tended to focus on 5 because its salience as the middle of the response scale). a better alternative after day 7 (given no alternative on or before day 7) is G 10 − G 7 / 1 − G 7 = 0 5-0 35 / 1-0 35 = 0 23. Given these probabilities, the expected value maximizing SAD for the responders is 7. This is the point at which expected value of waiting for a better alternative dips below (to S$40 × 0 23 = S$9.20) the value of the proposer's offer (S$10).
We employed the strategy method to capture subjects' decision policies for the game. Under this method, subjects provide a complete strategy profile for the game, that is, they specify what they would do in each feasible scenario that might arise in the game. This is a much more economical means of obtaining responses than the sequential decision method in which the proposer first makes an offer and then the responder decides whether to accept or reject it. As an example, under the sequential procedure, one does not know whether a deadline of six days would have been acceptable to a responder who accepts an offer with a deadline of eight days. The strategy method makes a responder's SAD directly observable. Results from laboratory studies of sequential games are mixed on whether the elicitation procedure affects behavior (e.g., Brandts and Charness 2000 , Cason and Mui 1998 , and Oxoby and McLeish 2004 found no effect of elicitation procedure on responses, whereas Blount and Bazerman 1996 , Brosig et al. 2003 , and Güth et al. 2001 .
Subjects in the responder role were asked to provide their SAD, and those in the proposer role were asked to set their deadline for the responder. These values were input using a slider that could be set to any integer value between 1 and 10 days, inclusive.
Once all the data were collected, for each experimental responder whether and when a better alternative came was resolved precisely according to the probabilities provided to the participants. The arrival of an alternative offer was modeled as follows: First, it was determined randomly whether the responder would receive an alternative (the probability of which was 0.50). Next, if the responder was to receive an alternative, its arrival time was decided by sampling randomly with uniform probability over the 10 periods. Each responder was then randomly paired with one proposer, and payoffs to each subject in each pair were determined according to the rules of the game. 8 In short, the game played by the experimental subjects was exactly the ultimatum deadline game described in §3 using the payoff parameters and arrival probabilities described above.
Results
The frequency distributions of the responders' shortest acceptable deadlines (left panel) and of the deadlines set by proposers (right panel) are shown in Figure 1 . Notice first that there is considerable heterogeneity in the responders' shortest acceptable deadlines. 9 The mean SAD was 6.97 (SD = 2 01), and they ranged from 1 to 10.
Likewise, we find considerable variability in the deadlines set by the subjects in the proposer role, with a mean deadline of 6.00 (SD = 1 81). The majority of the proposers (63%) set deadlines that were shorter than the one that would be optimal if all the responders had used expected value maximizing SADs of 7. However, because the responders' SADs were variable, the appropriate standard to evaluate the proposers' deadlines is their best response to the empirical distribution of SADs, as in our theoretical analysis in § §3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Figure 2 shows the expected payoffs to a proposer as a function of her deadline given the responders' SADs. These expectations are based on the empirical distribution of SADs in the sample; they are the expected payoffs to a proposer given the rules of the game and the actual distribution of the responders' SADs. The subjects in the proposer role would have maximized their expected payoffs by setting a deadline of 10 (the longest possible deadline). Thus, overwhelmingly, the experimental proposers (93% of them) set deadlines that were too short. Their payoffs suffered considerably: On average, they earned only 40% of the payoffs they could have earned by setting their deadlines optimally (i.e., to 10, their best response). 
Summary of Behavioral Experiment
Our experimental study of the ultimatum deadline game produced several important findings. First, we find that responders' shortest acceptable deadlines are indeed heterogeneous: they do not all set the same 8 A small number of responders had to be paired with multiple proposers because of unequal numbers in the groups. Payoffs were determined after all data had been collected; so this matching procedure did not affect the results. 9 The subjects' verbal descriptions of their strategies for settings SADs and deadlines revealed heterogeneity in strategic reasoning as well. 10 This penalty for deviating from optimality is substantially greater than those typically found in similar behavioral experiments, such as those on optimal stopping. Due to the "flat maximum" problem, in other studies, we have found that behavioral biases tend to produce no more than a 10% payoff penalty (e.g., Bearden et al. 2006) . The payoff losses to the proposers in the current study are quite substantial. one. Thus, the assumption that the responder's type is (or could be) known is violated empirically. Therefore, to set suitable deadlines, proposers must take into consideration the variability in SADs. Second, the proposers tended to set deadlines that were considerably shorter than they ought to have been to maximize their expected payoffs. (Note that the pro- posers' payoffs depend only on the probability that the responders will accept their offers; so risk aversion of proposers, for instance, cannot account for the shorter deadlines.) The net result was a large number of rejected offers.
Conclusions
Most contract offers, including employment offers, have expiration dates. At one extreme is a take-it-orleave-it (or immediately exploding) offer where the deadline can be thought of as zero (on the spot). At the other extreme is an offer that is valid for quite a long time, until the responder makes up his mind (for instance, such offers are quite common for bigshot hires, both in academia and industry). In many other instances, the deadline would fall somewhere in between. Steve Ballmer's three-week deadline for Yahoo! is one example. A one-week deadline for a McKinsey offer to a new MBA is another.
When setting the deadline, the proposer would like to minimize the chances that the offer will be rejected. The responder may reject the offer for two reasons: First, he can already have a better alternative. Second, he might decide that it is better to reject the proposer's offer and hope for a better one to come later. The proposer's challenge is to balance these two factors. Giving a take-it-or-leave-it offer will minimize the probability that the responder will find a better alternative before the deadline, but unless the responder values the proposer's offer very highly, he will reject it in hopes of finding something better. On the other hand, setting a very long deadline gives the responder enough time to explore other alternatives and thus will minimize the probability that the responder will reject the offer hoping for something better. However, doing so increases the probability that the responder will find a better alternative before the proposer's deadline.
In our model, the responder is searching for other alternatives following a finite-horizon search process. This horizon might be determined by market conditions (e.g., the job market clears by March) or might arise from the responder's own commitments (to find a job before January, to sell a house within one month). At the deadline, the responder will accept the proposer's offer only if its value exceeds the expected value of continuing the search. Because the expected value of continuing the search is decreasing in time, the responder's strategy is characterized by a SAD: accept (reject) the proposer's offer if its deadline is longer (shorter) than SAD. This result is formalized in Proposition 1. This responder's strategy implies that, in general, neither very short (take-it-or-leave-it) nor very long deadlines (e.g., equal to the horizon of search process) are optimal for the proposer. A take-it-or-leaveit offer will be rejected unless the responder is quite pessimistic about his (potential) outside alternatives. An overly long deadline is not optimal because an offer with a shorter deadline (but longer than the SAD) would also be accepted by the responder, but the longer deadline gives the responder more time to find a better alternative. We show that indeed the proposer should set the deadline equal to the responder's SAD, if this SAD is known to the proposer. This conclusion is also valid for a standard search process in which the coming alternatives are i.i.d. (The details are in Proposition 6 and Example 2.)
In most instances, the proposer would not know the responder's SAD exactly, but would have some guesses about the responder's potential alternatives and thus about the responder's SAD. We address this issue in two settings: First, we assume that the responder's SAD can take only one of two values (Propositions 2 and 7). We show that if the two possible SADs are not very far from one another (put differently, if the uncertainty about the responder's SAD is not very large), it is optimal to set the deadline equal to the longer SAD. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that (under mild uncertainty) it is better to make sure that the responder does not reject the offer because he hopes to find a better alternative (i.e., because the offer's deadline is shorter than the responder's SAD).
If deadlines are far from each other, we establish the conditions for the shorter or the longer deadline to be optimal. Next, we assume that the responder's SAD is drawn from a continuous distribution ( §3.2.2). In this setting the conclusions are similar: when uncertainty about the responder's SAD is not very substantial, it is better to set a longer deadline, compared to the case of no uncertainty.
Our theoretical analysis yields two main takeaways: First, we would expect the optimal deadline to be longer than zero (i.e., take-it-or-leave-it offers are not optimal) and shorter than the horizon of the responder's search process (i.e., it is suboptimal to allow the responder to examine all potential alternatives before making a decision). Second, if the responder's SAD is unknown, it is better to set a deadline longer than if it were known. We test these prescriptions in the behavioral experiment.
In the experiment we find that the average SAD set by the responders equals the SAD that would be optimal if a responder were maximizing expected payoff. However, there is considerable variability in the responders' SADs. Given the variability, our model suggests that the proposers should set a deadline longer than the average SAD of the responders. That was not the case: the average deadline set by the proposers was shorter than the average SAD of the responders. Nonoptimal deadlines seem to be driven by miscalibrated beliefs about how opponents are likely to behave.
One reasonable inference to draw from the experimental data is that the proposers underestimated both the mean and the variance of the SAD distribution. Thus, it seems that our theoretical results have important prescriptive value: if one is not sure about the responder's reaction, it is safer to set a deadline longer than one's (best point) estimate of the responder's SAD. Hedging in the direction of longer deadlines is a safer policy.
The focus of this paper is on advising proposers on setting deadlines. Our model captures the main trade-off when setting the deadline, namely the balance between the probability that the responder will reject the offer in hope of getting better alternatives later and the probability that the responder will find a better alternative prior to the deadline being reached. There are many directions in which the model can be extended, and many related issues to be explored. For example, the value of the offer can be a decision variable for the proposer. It is not in many job market situations, e.g., academic job markets for rookies, because in many instances salary for a particular position is nonnegotiable. Of course, in many settings, e.g., Microsoft's bid for Yahoo!, deciding on the value of the offer would also be important. Another extension could include multiple responders, with potentially different utilities for the proposer, where in addition to the offer deadline, the proposer would also need to decide which responder to approach first. We expect that the trade-off between longer and shorter deadlines established here would be an important factor in those extended settings as well.
It is hard to resist noting that Yahoo! did not respond to Microsoft's ultimatum. Though we are not sure, it is quite plausible that Yahoo! wanted more time to explore its alternatives with Google and AOL. Anticipating that, perhaps Ballmer should have set a longer deadline.
